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“For Slow Neutrons, Slow Pay”
Enrico Fermi’s Patent and the U.S. Atomic
Energy Program, 1938–1953
By Simone Turchetti*
ABSTRACT
This essay focuses on the history of one of the “atomic patents.” The patent, which de-
scribed a process to slow down neutrons in nuclear reactions, was the result of experimental
research conducted in the 1930s by Enrico Fermi and his group at the Institute of Physics,
University of Rome. The value of the patented process became clear during World War
II, as it was involved in most of the military and industrial applications of atomic energy.
This ignited a controversy between Fermi and U.S. government representatives over roy-
alties to be paid for use of the process during and after the war. The controversy sheds
new light on the role that the management of patents played in the context of the Man-
hattan Project and in the postwar U.S. nuclear program, encompassing issues of power
and economic influence in the relationship between scientists, the military, and public
administrators.
The invention covered by Patent No. 2,206,634 covers the basic process used in the re-
search and development leading up the production of atomic energy and the production
of the atomic bomb. Such invention is of continuing importance in the production of
fissionable materials and atomic weapons.
The Chairman: So Jones might make the greatest invention in the field and be de-
prived of any award for it?
Captain Lavender: If he did not want to accept the award that was offered to him.
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O N 8 DECEMBER 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the “Atoms forPeace” campaign, announcing that the U.S. government was ready to set up an inter-
national “bank of fissionable materials” to be used for peaceful applications of atomic
energy. His speech marked the beginning of new international relations in the nuclear age.
But the venture’s economic implications were also far reaching. It paved the way to the
creation of a new market, dependent on U.S. nuclear products made available through the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), for which foreign governments would spend no less
than $20 billion in the following decade. The president suggested that “the miraculous
inventiveness of man” would now be consecrated to life rather than death.1 Yet a far more
mundane type of ingenuity, embodied in one patent, had played a key role in forming the
edifice of the emergent U.S. nuclear industry. The patent (see Figure 1) claimed intellectual
rights over a process to slow down neutrons in nuclear reactions that was instrumental in
the functioning of nuclear piles, the main devices for the production of fissile materials.
Hence, any economic venture based on making nuclear products relied on the acquisition
of the right to use the patented process.
Eisenhower’s speech was timely: just four months earlier, the AEC had finally awarded
the Italian-born nuclear physicist Enrico Fermi and his associates $300,000 for the pur-
chase of U.S. patent no. 2,206,634. If the parties involved were satisfied with this outcome,
it was nonetheless the subject of ironic remarks in the media. Time magazine ran the story
under the title “For Slow Neutrons, Slow Pay,” noting that it was not until eighteen years
after originally filing the patent that Fermi and his colleagues would reap any financial
benefit from it. Moreover, the patent was finally sold for a sum that was far less than had
initially been agreed upon. Whatever this “slow” acquisition had contributed to the success
of the fast-growing U.S. nuclear industry, it seemed that the celebrated “Italian navigator”
had gained little more than celebrity from it.2
This essay examines the history of Fermi’s patent from 1938 to 1953, with particular
attention to the political and historical contexts of its slow and bargained acquisition. Such
an investigation may initially look like a digression into administrative matters that are of
little or no relevance to the historian of science. Yet I suggest that there is more to the
history of this patent than meets the eye. Recent controversies about patent provisions and
their impact on scientific communities have shown that the management of inventions
1 The epigraphs come from G. M. Giannini & Co., “Application for Just Compensation and the Determination
of a Reasonable Royalty Fee under Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,” p. 3, in “Neutron Patent,”
Scatola [Box] 2, Fascicolo [Folder] 2, Amaldi Collection; and “Senate Hearing on Atomic Energy, Atomic Bomb
Patents,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1946, 1(7):10–11. Eisenhower launched the “Atoms for Peace”
campaign in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 8 Dec. 1953; see http://
www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/atoms.htm (accessed 3 Aug. 2004). On the new “nuclear” international relations see
Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988), pp. 155–158; see also A. M.
Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993). According
to Leonard Weiss, “many in the U.S. government and private industry saw Atoms for Peace as the umbrella
under which a U.S.-dominated world nuclear market would be realized”: Leonard Weiss, “Atoms for Peace,”
Bull. Atom. Sci., 2003, 59(6):34–41.
2
“For Slow Neutrons, Slow Pay,” Time, 10 Aug. 1953. See also “U.S. Settles with Seven over Suit,” New
York Times, 1 Aug. 1953; Giuseppe Prezzolini, “Il brevetto delle scoperte atomiche italiane comprato dagli SU
per trecentomila dollari,” Corriere della Sera, 1 Aug. 1953; and “Atomic Patent Payoff: Italian Scientists Who
Derived Isotopes Are Compensated,” New York Times, 9 Aug. 1953. “Italian navigator” was a code name referring
to Fermi that Arthur Holly Compton used in a phone conversation with James B. Conant to inform him about
Fermi’s successful experiment with the first nuclear pile in December 1942. Compton said: “Jim, you’ll be
interested to know that the Italian navigator has landed in the new world.” Richard Rhodes, The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (New York: Penguin, 1986), p. 442.
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4 “FOR SLOW NEUTRONS, SLOW PAY”
informs the research activities of contemporary scientists.3 Coverage of these controversies
has also indicated that we still know comparatively little about how patent cases influenced
the development of the physical sciences in the twentieth century.4 The story of Fermi’s
patent deepens our understanding of how such matters were interwoven with the career of
one of the most distinguished U.S. scientists, helping to set his research directions and
goals.
More significantly, this history sheds new light on the relationship between scientists,
the government, and the military involved in the U.S. nuclear program: in looking at one
important patent case, we can focus on how this relationship was molded by the parties’
respective economic interests and clout. In the war and postwar years the control of intel-
lectual property rights made both the military and the government important mediators in
the financial relationships with scientists and firms. Their involvement weakened the con-
tractual power of scientists and limited their ability freely to dispose of their “atomic
patents.” Some of these developments aroused Fermi’s and other scientists’ resistance,
which led to financial and legal arguments with U.S. military and civilian administrators.
It is my contention that these disputes were symptomatic of changing power relationships
in the context of the U.S. nuclear program. And because these controversies unfolded in
three important moments in U.S. history—the Manhattan Project, the establishment of the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the rise of domestic anti-Communism—their examina-
tion offers a new historical narrative that fills important gaps in the historiographies of
those moments as well.
Some historians have claimed that the Manhattan Project was pivotal to the establish-
ment of what we now call “big science” and that it defined a new power relationship
between scientists and the military.5 However, little has surfaced on the specific conditions
in patent provisions and management that influenced this change.6 Peter Bacon Hales’s
3 See, e.g., the recent debate on the consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), which established a uniform
federal patent policy in the United States under which universities would be free to patent and license their
discoveries in exchange for royalties and fees. Recent changes in research direction and individual scientists’
pursuits have been informed by the new patent legislation. See Jennifer Washburn, University, Inc.: The Cor-
porate Corruption of Higher Education (New York: Basic, 2004), pp. 60–69.
4 For patents in general see Geof Bowker, “What’s in a Patent,” in Shaping Technology/Building Society:
Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), pp.
53–74. See also Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew Webster, “Science as Intellectual Property,” in Handbook of
Science and Technology Studies, ed. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1994), pp. 480–505. For
patent management and controversies in twentieth-century physical sciences see John L. Heilbron and Robert
W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory: A History of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Vol. 1 (Berkeley:
Univ. California Press, 1989); Peter Galison, Bruce Hevly, and Rebecca Lowen, “Controlling the Monster:
Stanford and the Growth of Physics Research, 1935–1942,” in Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research,
ed. Galison and Hevly (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 46–77, on pp. 54–55; and Galison,
Einstein’s Clocks, Poincare´’s Maps (London: Sceptre, 2003).
5 On the Manhattan Project see Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb (cit. n. 2); Stephane Groueff, Manhattan
Project: The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Lawrence Badash,
J. O. Hirshfielder, and H. P. Broida, eds., Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943–1945 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980);
and Lillian Hoddeson et al., Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer
Years, 1943–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993). On big science see Galison and Hevly, eds., Big
Science; and Jeff Hughes, The Manhattan Project: Big Science and the Atom Bomb (London: Icon, 2002). On
the role played by patents in shaping big science in biomedicine see Nicolas Rasmussen, “Of ‘Small Men,’ Big
Science, and Bigger Business: The Second World War and Biomedical Research in the United States,” Minerva,
2002, 40:115–146. Rasmussen claims that “the perception of a sharp shift rests upon a conflation of wartime
contracts—which multiplied collaborative projects of an existing type—with qualitative changes introduced by
a different post-war funding regime” (p. 116).
6 This is not to say that there is a lack of historical details but, rather, that a “big picture” has not yet emerged.
Richard Rhodes has shown that in 1942 scientists associated with Fermi and the Manhattan Project had already
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imaginative study on the Manhattan Project has recently analyzed the “appropriation of
land and people” by the U.S. military-industrial complex.7 My study of Fermi’s patents
parallels his analysis by showing how this complex seized intellectual property rights as
well. When the exploitation of atomic energy became feasible, scientists and military
administrators clashed over the use of patented knowledge and the processes necessary to
capitalize on it. Compensation for this use was promised but never effected.
At the end of the war, the Atomic Energy Act ratified the establishment of the AEC,
which sought to restore legality in the use of atomic patents by allowing their purchase.
The new patent provisions embodied in this act have been the subject of a number of
historical studies.8 Yet these studies have failed to show comprehensively how the provi-
sions informed existing controversies between inventors and administrators. The case of
Fermi’s patent demonstrates that the AEC managers were resistant to settling existing
claims and that they used the new legislation to argue that no compensation should be
paid. It augmented their power to dispose of atomic patents, while further hampering the
scientists’ intellectual rights.
The tightening of national security in the Cold War, coupled with the rise of domestic
anti-Communism, added a new element to these quarrels. We already know a great deal
about the tension between scientists and the security apparatus. Alleged espionage activ-
ities and (real or constructed) anxieties about the presence of an “enemy within” are also
well understood.9 However, even as the public image of some atomic scientists fell into
the dichotomy of patriot/traitor, they were still engaged in clashes with administrators for
their due rewards. As the persecutory campaign gained momentum, it eroded the position
of Fermi and his colleagues as they sought to negotiate favorable conditions for the sale
of their atomic patent.
Overall, then, examining the management of atomic patents allows us to gain a new
perspective on the shifts in the economy of power within the U.S. nuclear program. In
demanded compensation for inventions relating to nuclear methods: Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp.
504–508. Ferenc Morton Szasz has argued that the U.S. and British governments had similar regulations allowing
them to use inventions stemming from military research projects: Ferenc Morton Szasz, British Scientists and
the Manhattan Project: The Los Alamos Years (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 25. See also Henry DeWolf Smyth,
Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the
Auspices of the U.S. Government (1945; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1989), p. 284; and David Hawkins,
ed., Project Y: The Los Alamos Story (San Francisco: Tomash, 1983). Some details have also emerged on the
history of patents on nuclear fission designed by the French physicist Fre´de´ric Joliot and his coworkers Lev
Kowarski and Hans Von Halban. These patents fueled litigation during and after World War II. See Margaret
Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (London: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 201–215; and C. Gilguy, “A
Good Example of Protection in the Nuclear Field: The Story of the Fundamental Patents of Joliot’s Team,” trans.
O. S. Whitston, UKAEA Research Group, Oct. 1963.
7 Peter Bacon Hales, Atomic Spaces: Living on the Manhattan Project (Urbana: Univ. Illinois Press, 1997),
p. 5.
8 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World: A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, 1939–1946 (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1962); Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History
of a Scientific Community in Modern America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 324–348;
Jessica Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science: The
National Science Foundation Debate Revisited,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 1995, 26:139–166;
Rasmussen, “Of ‘Small Men,’ Big Science, and Bigger Business” (cit. n. 5); and Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War
and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1993).
9 Marjorie Garber and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, eds., Secret Agents: The Rosenberg Case, McCarthyism, and
Fifties America (New York/London: Routledge, 1995); Jessica Wang, American Science in the Age of Anxiety:
Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press, 1999); and David Kaiser,
“The Atomic Secret in Red Hands? American Suspicions of Theoretical Physicists during the Early Cold War,”
Representations, 2005, 90:28–60 (I thank Kaiser for providing me with an earlier version of this paper).
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particular, the circumstances leading to the purchase of Fermi’s patent in 1953 show that
the new arrangements provided little economic benefit to the scientists whose inventiveness
had contributed so much to the establishment of that program.10
FERMI AND THE ATOMIC PATENT(S), 1938–1941
In 1938 Enrico Fermi migrated to the United States. Following a ceremony in Sweden that
culminated in the award of the Nobel Prize for his research, he continued on to the New
World instead of returning to Italy. His wife and two of his closest coworkers, Bruno
Pontecorvo and Emilio Segre`, were Jewish, and the anti-Semitic campaign recently
launched by the Fascist regime made it clear that their future in Italy was clouded. Pon-
tecorvo and Segre` had already left Italy when the legislation barring Jews from holding
university positions was implemented, migrating to Paris and Berkeley, respectively. When
Fermi arrived in New York he took up a post at Columbia University. But Fermi was not
new to the American scientific and industrial community. Since 1935 he had traveled to
the United States almost every summer, participating in research activities and attending
to business centered on the “slow neutron patents.”11 These activities continued to be an
important aspect of his (and his former colleagues’) career throughout the period that
anticipated his active involvement in U.S. military research.
In 1934 Fermi and his associates had developed a new method for the production of
artificial radioactive substances that used slow neutrons as projectiles. The group, based
at the University of Rome, included Fermi’s friend and colleague Franco Rasetti; three
young physicists—Edoardo Amaldi, Segre`, and Pontecorvo; and the young chemist Oscar
D’Agostino. They began their research on neutrons when, in January 1934, the French
physicists Fre´de´ric Joliot and Ire`ne Curie announced that they had obtained important
radioactivation effects by bombarding nuclei of a light element with -particles at their
institute in Paris. Fermi soon realized that neutrons might prove to be better projectiles
than -particles because they have no electric charge. The group’s early experiments with
the neutron sources polonium and beryllium produced encouraging results, showing im-
portant radioactivation effects in some elements and confirming Fermi’s initial intuition.
This research became known internationally through publications in prominent journals.12
10 Fermi’s friends and colleagues Emilio Segre` and Edoardo Amaldi have analyzed these issues, but without
discussing the content of previously unseen documentary evidence pertaining to Fermi’s controversy with the
AEC or relating this controversy to changes in the U.S. nuclear program. See Emilio Segre`, Enrico Fermi:
Physicist (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 83–85; and Edoardo Amaldi, “From the Discovery of the
Neutron to the Discovery of Nuclear Fission,” Physics Reports, 1984, 111:5–331, on pp. 154–160.
11 On Fermi’s move to the United States see Giulio Maltese, Enrico Fermi in America: Una biografia scien-
tifica, 1938–1954 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 2003), p. 35; and Segre`, Enrico Fermi, p. 101. See also James W. Cronin,
Fermi Remembered (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 2004). For his business activities see Simone Turchetti, “The
Invisible Businessman: Nuclear Physics, Patenting Practices, and Trading Activities in the 1930s,” Hist. Stud.
Phys. Sci., Fall 2006, in press. On the Fascists’ anti-Semitic policy and how it affected Italian physicists see
Lucia Orlando, “Physics in the 1930s: Jewish Physicists’ Contribution to the ‘New Tasks’ of Physics in Italy,”
ibid., 1998, 29:141–181; and Giorgio Israel and Pietro Nastasi, Scienza e razza nell’Italia Fascista (Bologna: Il
Mulino, 1998).
12 F. Joliot and I. Curie, “Artificial Production of a New Kind of Radio-Element,” Nature, 1934, 133:201–
202; E. Fermi, “Radioactivity Induced by Neutron Bombardment,” ibid., p. 757; and Fermi, E. Amaldi,
O. D’Agostino, F. Rasetti, and E. Segre`, “Artificial Radioactivity Produced by Neutron Bombardment,” Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Society of London, 1934, 146:483–500. For an account of this work see Segre`, Enrico
Fermi, pp. 68–78, esp. p. 77. See also Laura Fermi, Atoms in the Family: My Life with Enrico Fermi (Chicago:
Univ. Chicago Press, 1954); Gerald Holton, “Fermi’s Group and the Recapture of Italy’s Place in Physics,” in
The Scientific Imagination: Case Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 155–198; and
Giovanni Battimelli and Michelangelo De Maria, “La fisica,” in Per una storia del Consiglio Nazionale delle
Ricerche, ed. R. Simili and G. Paoloni (Bari: Laterza, 2001), pp. 281–311.
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But the group’s members continued to design new experiments, and in the summer of
1934 Amaldi and Pontecorvo observed that the same neutron-induced nuclear reactions
yielded differently if performed on tables made of different materials. This suggested that
different media affect them. In October 1934 Fermi placed a block of the hydrocarbon
paraffin between his neutron source and several target elements, registering an exceptional
increase in the yield of radioactivity in fourteen different elements: substances containing
atoms of hydrogen could slow neutrons down, thereby increasing the probability of col-
lisions between the neutrons and the target elements’ nuclei.13
Fermi’s well-known “Eureka!” moment also involved an awareness of the technique’s
industrial implications. These included the possibility of producing artificial radioactive
substances for use in medical treatment and the possibility of exploiting the neutrons in
energy-liberating processes.14 Given the state of knowledge in the prewar years, harnessing
this energy for power generation did not look like an immediately viable prospect; none-
theless, Fermi’s work engendered expectations that this would become possible in a not-
too-distant future.15 Aware of the potential industrial significance of their research, Fermi
and his coworkers covered the method with two patents over the next two years, one
describing the process of slowing down neutrons through the action of “hydrogenated”
substances and the other depicting the production of sixty new artificial isotopes through
this method and following b-decay.16 The patents were filed in the U.S., Canadian, and
fourteen European patent offices, and Gabriello M. Giannini (a businessman and Fermi’s
consultant, whose office was located in New York) was made responsible for trading the
patents and discussing their purchase with major industrial companies such as General
Electric and Westinghouse. Giannini was to receive an equal share of any royalties that
were forthcoming from the U.S. and Canadian patents, in return for working on the in-
ventors’ behalf, and his newly established company—G. M. Giannini and Company—
became the assignor of these patents. In 1935 Giannini established a financial partnership
with the Dutch firm Philips, which was interested in exploiting Fermi’s process for the
production of new neutron tubes. Later he also partnered with L. V. Graner, a Philips
consulting engineer who lived and worked in New York.17
13 E. Fermi, E. Amaldi, B. Pontecorvo, F. Rasetti, and E. Segre`, “Azione di sostanze idrogenate sulla radio-
attivita` provocata da neutroni,” Ricerca Scientifica, 1934, 5:282–283. See also Gerald Holton, “The Miracle of
the Two Tables: Enrico Fermi, a Piece of Paraffin, and the Way towards Nuclear Fission,” in Victory and Vexation
in Science: Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Others (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 48–64.
14 Just four days after the publication of the paper announcing the group’s results, Fermi filed an application
for a patent on the process (Privativa no. 324,458). A copy was also sent to Britain’s patent office: E. Amaldi,
O. D’Agostino, E. Fermi, B. Pontecorvo, F. Rasetti, and E. Segre`, “Method for Increasing the Efficiency of
Nuclear Reactions and Products Thereof,” GB 465,045, convention date (Italy): 26 Oct. 1934; application date:
25 Oct. 1935; issued: 26 Apr. 1937. At the time, the major field of application for radioisotopes was in medicine,
where they were used as sources of radiation for diagnosis (as X-rays emitters) and treatment (of leukemia and
other cancers). See Heilbron and Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory (cit. n. 4), pp. 187–188.
15 The promise of this work was stressed in June 1934 by Fermi’s patron, Orso M. Corbino: O. M. Corbino,
“Prospettive e risultati della fisica moderna,” Ric. Sci., 1934, 5:615–620, on p. 618.
16 E. Fermi, E. Amaldi, B. Pontecorvo, F. Rasetti, and E. Segre`, “Process for the Production of Radioactive
Substances,” U.S. patent application no. 43,462, filed on 3 Oct. 1935 (the Italian patent differed from its U.S.
equivalent because it also contained the names of D’Agostino and Giulio C. Trabacchi, who was the director of
the Institute for Higher Health in Rome and provided the radioactive material that Fermi used); and E. Fermi,
“Composition of Matter and Method of Producing the Same,” U.S. patent application no. 57,325, filed on 2 Jan.
1936.
17 Giannini was one of Fermi’s former students. He considered himself a scientist of lesser quality than the
other members of the group and believed that his future lay in trading scientific inventions rather than in research.
Thus he left Italy for the United States and opened an office in New York. See Amaldi, “From the Discovery of
the Neutron to the Discovery of Nuclear Fission” (cit. n. 10), p. 318 n 526. On the partnership with Philips see
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While Fermi was employed at Columbia, the understanding of physical processes as-
sociated with his transmutation method greatly improved. In the period between 1939 and
1941, further studies revealed that—under certain conditions—the nuclear fission of an
isotope of uranium, U-235, could yield an enormous amount of energy and radioactivity.
These developments emerged thanks to studies and experiments conducted independently
by Joliot, Hans Von Halban, and Lev Kowarski in France, Otto Hahn and Lise Meitner in
Germany, and Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch in Britain. The theoretical process behind
nuclear fission was also explored by the physicists Niels Bohr and John Wheeler and
discussed by Fermi and Bohr in January 1939. This accumulating evidence convinced
Fermi to continue his work, assisted by the American researchers Herbert Anderson and
Walter Zinn. As the war was beginning in Europe, Fermi and his e´migre´ colleague Leo
Szilard (who was also conducting research on nuclear fission at Columbia) became aware
that the process of nuclear fission had military implications and thus asked for government
support to explore it further.18
However, these findings not only opened a path toward military applications of fission
but also confirmed the importance of the work Fermi sought to protect through his patent
applications. Precisely because of these new developments, Fermi continued to follow the
proceedings at the U.S. patent office.19 Since 1936, the two patent applications had been
scrutinized by patent officers, who had moved a number of objections. The first—and
only—slow neutron patent was issued on 2 July 1940. Patent officers rejected the second
application several times on the grounds that Fermi had published his findings in papers
before filing it.20 These rulings forced Fermi and his attorney, Truman Safford, to file a
claim before the U.S. Patent Office Board of Appeals, which rejected it on 12 May 1941,
thus terminating the case.21
Patenting and business activities had been important for Fermi’s former associates too.
Emilio Segre`, who from 1938 was employed at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, began
a study on a new artificial element, plutonium (Pu), that was produced through neutron
capture in uranium (U-238) and following decay by b-emission. Between 1939 and 1942,
Philips to Emilio Segre`, 20 Sept. 1935, and H. Hijman, Chef des Services des bre`vets d’invention des usines,
Philips, to Enrico Fermi, 20 Sept. 1935, Scatola 1, Fascicolo 2, “Brevetto Neutroni,” carte 34–35, Amaldi
Collection. More details about the industrial research activities of Philips can be found in Kees Boersma, “Ten-
sions within an Industrial Research Laboratory: The Philips Laboratory’s X-ray Department between the Wars,”
Enterprise and Society, 2003, 4:65–98, on p. 77. On Giannini’s partnership with Graner see Philips claim for
just compensation, copy in Box 19, Folder 7, Fermi Papers.
18 Details on Peierls and Frisch’s work can be found in Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (cit.
n. 6), pp. 40–44; see also Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb (cit. n. 2), Chs. 9–12. On explorations of the
theoretical process behind nuclear fission see Segre`, Enrico Fermi (cit. n. 10), p. 106; and Smyth, Atomic Energy
for Military Purposes (cit. n. 6), p. 24. Bohr and Wheeler contributed to this research by showing that natural
uranium (U-238) would not produce a chain reaction, in contrast with one of its isotopes, U-235. On Szilard see
William Lanouette, Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, the Man Behind the Bomb (Chicago:
Univ. Chicago Press, 1992).
19 According to U.S. legislation, patent officers are to take an active role in investigating the novelty and
effectiveness of the device or process to be protected by a patent, which forces the inventors to document and
defend their claims actively before any patent is finally issued.
20 According to the U.S. law, “the inventor is required to move fairly promptly with respect to the filing of a
patent application or his invention may be rendered un-patentable by the publication of an article”: Casper Ooms,
“Atomic Energy and U.S. Patent Policy, Pt. 1: History of the Patent System,” Bull. Atom. Sci., 1946, 2(9):28–
29.
21 U.S. Patent Office, Board of Appeals, Appeal No. 32,841, copy in Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers. The
appeal was rejected on the grounds that Fermi’s invention was anticipated in at least four publications published
in scientific journals between 1933 and 1934. A patent with the same content—but a different title—was issued
by the Canadian patent office on 22 Sept. 1942: E. Fermi, “Radio-active Isotope Production,” Canadian patent
no. 407,559.
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working in a team that included Glenn T. Seaborg, Herbert F. York, Joseph W. Kennedy,
and Arthur C. Wahl, Segre` investigated the chemical and physical properties of a plutonium
isotope (Pu-239) that was believed to have fissile characteristics similar to those of U-235.
Their research ultimately led to the filing of five new patent applications on plutonium and
the methods to produce it.22 Following the invasion of France by German troops, in 1940,
Bruno Pontecorvo moved from Paris to the United States. Thanks to Segre`, he was em-
ployed by Wells Surveys, Inc., in Oklahoma, where between 1941 and 1943 he developed
new industrial methods for geophysical prospecting using neutron-emitting radioactive
sources. This work led to the design of four patent applications on detectors. From 1940,
Giannini became more involved in the rearmament business. During the war his company
became a contractor for the U.S. Army; it also designed, patented, and produced jet engines
for the Lockheed Corporation.23
On 7 December 1941 the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, forcing the United States into
the world conflict. The position of Italians in the United States now became far more
complicated, as they were considered “enemy aliens” living on American soil. The primary
consequence was that the movements of Italian e´migre´s within the United States were
restricted, but it was also feared that alien citizens would soon be forced to leave the
country. In September 1942 Safford alerted Fermi and Rasetti (who had also recently
moved to the United States) that, as an enemy alien, Fermi should report his patent to the
Alien Property Custodian to avoid seizure.24
Between 1941 and 1942, the military implications of atomic energy took center stage
and the project to build an atom bomb began to take shape. On 19 August 1941 Fermi
was named chief of an advisory subcommittee discussing research in the context of the
so-called uranium project.25 Because of the secrecy rules established within the project,
contacts regarding financial matters between corporations, Giannini, and Fermi became
more sporadic. But even during the conflict the atomic patents continued to be an important
issue for Fermi and his colleagues.
22 The Berkeley researchers filed five patents: one on the substance, two on the chemical methods of producing
it, and two on their uses. Fermi was asked to provide advice on one of these patents. Segre` to Fermi, 24 Nov.
1942, “Emilio Segre`,” Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers. See also Segre`, Enrico Fermi (cit. n. 10), pp. 117–119.
23 On Pontecorvo see Simone Turchetti, “Atomic Secrets and Governmental Lies: Nuclear Science, Policy,
and Security in the Pontecorvo Case,” British Journal for the History of Science, 2003, 36:389–415. Giannini’s
activities interfered with his efforts on behalf of the slow neutron patents. As Giannini wrote to Segre`: “my
activities keep me considerably occupied, and I do not feel that I may continue this prosecution in any more
advantageous position, as you may, for example do yourself.” Gabriello Giannini to Segre`, 11 Nov. 1941, Box
19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers.
24
“Any individual person to whom an unexpired US Letter Patent has been granted upon an application filed
when such a person was a citizen or resident of a foreign country and who has since moved . . . shall on or
before 15 August 1942 file with the APC a statement under oath containing the patent number, present residence
and citizenship”: Capt. Ives Waldo, Division of Investigation and Research, Alien Property Custodian, Chicago,
to Fermi, 28 Sept. 1942, Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers. Rasetti could have reported the patent himself, but—
given Fermi’s reputation and the fact that he had been in the United States longer—he concluded that Fermi
was in a better position to deal with the Alien Property Custodian. Giannini had foreseen potential problems as
early as 1939, when he wrote that “under these conditions . . . should a state of hostilities become existing
between Italy and the US . . . it would be possible to prevent government expropriation by demonstrating to the
satisfaction of the US authorities that the patents are actual American property”: Giannini to Segre` (copy to
Fermi), 18 Apr. 1939, “Emilio Segre`,” Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers. On 12 Oct. 1942, to mark the 450th
anniversary of the discovery of America, President Franklin D. Roosevelt revoked the status of enemy aliens for
Italians. See Maltese, Enrico Fermi in America (cit. n. 11), p. 105.
25 Maltese, Enrico Fermi in America, p. 88.
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INVENTIONS AT LOS ALAMOS, 1942–1945
The delineation of a patent policy that would accommodate the financial interests of sci-
entists and companies was seen as a priority for military leaders involved in the uranium
project. The new circumstances dictated by the war led the military to seek control over
patents describing atomic processes, methods, and instruments. Military officers decided
that previously issued patents would be used during the project with the promise of future
compensation, while new patents coming out of the uranium project would be appropriated
by the U.S. government. With the establishment of the project code-named Manhattan
Engineer District (MED) and the Los Alamos laboratory, the government sought to defend
its security interests by making most new patents a military secret. All scientists employed
by the government were pressured to hand over the rights to new patents resulting from
their research and led to expect compensation for the use of previously issued patents.
In 1942 the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), directed by
Vannevar Bush, outlined a patent policy that effectively made any inventor, assignor, or
company dealing with the uranium project dependent on its control in the design of new
patents. The new provisions gave the government “the power to determine the disposition
of all rights in discoveries and inventions made under the contracts” for national defense
purposes. This stipulation was accepted by the major companies employed in the project,
including Standard Oil, General Electric, Westinghouse, Kellogg, and Du Pont. Inventors
involved in the project considered that military control offered them a better prospect than
appropriation of their old or newly patented inventions by private companies; therefore
they too accepted the new requirements.26
At this stage, Fermi was leading the project for the construction of a nuclear pile. After
several experiments conducted in New York proved unsuccessful in producing a sustain-
able chain reaction, Fermi, Szilard, and their teams moved to the University of Chicago,
where on 2 December 1942 the Chicago Pile (CP-1) produced the first self-sustaining
nuclear fission (see Frontispiece).27 The scientific principle of slowing neutrons down was
integral to the functioning of CP-1, which was moderated with the hydrocarbon graphite.
The successful CP-1 experiment contributed to the design of new nuclear reactors that
used Fermi’s method for slowing neutrons to perform nuclear reactions on a large scale.
In years to come, this would enable scientists to produce fissionable materials for atomic
weapons and radioisotopes for research, industrial, and medical purposes. Fermi’s patented
method had now become a prominent feature of applied nuclear physics.
Even in the aftermath of the crucial discovery that allowed the “Italian navigator” to
“land in the new world,” scientists, science administrators, and military men were consid-
ering the problem of existing patents covering the processes and instruments used. This
issue was pertinent to Leo Szilard because he had conducted prewar studies—and filed
patents—on the chain reaction. On 4 December 1942 (only two days after Fermi’s CP-1
experiment), Szilard was requested by a military administrator to file a patent relating to
26
“The Manhattan District took the responsibility of ferreting out the inventors. They were working for the
University of Chicago, and they didn’t want to let anybody think that Du Pont was going to grab any of the
patents”: “Senate Hearing on Atomic Energy, Atomic Bomb Patents” (cit. n. 1), pp. 10–11. The conflict between
scientists and corporations is also described in Groueff, Manhattan Project (cit. n. 5), pp. 29–30, 133.
27 In 1942 Fermi’s experiments had focused on creating convergent chain reactions of increasing extent; on
measurements of the fission cross-section of uranium and the neutron-absorption cross-section of graphite; on
determination of the optimum arrangement of materials; and on calculation of the reactivity factor k, indicating
the relation between neutrons produced and captured in the system. See Hoddeson et al., Critical Assembly (cit.
n. 5), Ch. 3; and Maltese, Enrico Fermi in America (cit. n. 11), Ch. 6.
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the chain reaction. But before doing so, Szilard wanted to know the policy adopted on
patents protecting “inventions made and disclosed before we had the benefit of the financial
support of the government.”28 The chief administrator of the project, Arthur Holly Comp-
ton, referred Szilard’s case to Robert A. Lavender, a Navy captain and attorney who headed
the OSRD Washington Headquarters patent office.
With the establishment of Los Alamos, the bureaucratic machinery concerned with de-
fending and acquiring patentable nuclear knowledge began to take shape.29 After the dis-
tasteful episode with Szilard, which no one wanted to see repeated, Lavender outlined four
different contractual procedures for handling patents issued to (or filed by) companies. As
Nicolas Rasmussen has noted, these procedures were similar to those that had been in
place in the U.S. industry during the interwar years.30
When the Los Alamos laboratory was formed, it included a patent office as part of its
administration. This office, which was responsible for dealing with individual inventors,
began operating in July 1943. Captain Ralph Carlisle Smith—one of Lavender’s assistants
at the OSRD—was appointed as advisor on patent matters. The office immediately as-
sumed responsibility for unfinished patents. It collected records of the researchers’ com-
pleted work, including their existing inventions, with a view to covering them by patents.
Smith commanded that the personnel keep workbooks with records of recent discoveries;
these records would “be given the greatest evidential effect in legal proceedings” if patents
were to be filed.31 The patent applications on “sensitive” inventions were placed under a
“secrecy order”; the patents could not be issued until the applications were declassified.32
Finally, personnel leaving Los Alamos were to appear before the patent officers and assert
that they had made no unrecorded inventions. Smith’s office worked on five hundred patent
cases altogether; completed cases were transferred to Lavender and filed with the U.S.
patent office.33
28 Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb (cit. n. 2), pp. 442, 503.
29 Initially it was believed that atomic patents could fall under a bilateral agreement between the United States
and the United Kingdom. In the first half of 1942 Bush discussed these matters with Wallace Akers and Michael
Perrin, the representatives of the British wartime atomic program. No agreement was reached, however. See
Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (cit. n. 6), p. 206.
30 The first procedure allowed the government to dispose of all rights in discoveries and inventions; it was
extended to most research contracts. The second allowed the contractors to retain a nonexclusive license in
“outfield” commercial activities (i.e., those outside the atomic energy program). The third, which allowed con-
tractors to retain the sole license and to grant sublicenses, came into play if the patent was largely outside atomic
developments. The fourth dealt with patents for which purchases were “off the shelf”; the government would
assume liability for their infringement. See “Senate Hearing on Atomic Energy, Atomic Bomb Patents” (cit. n.
1). These contractual procedures were also applied in other fields, such as biomedical research, where “the OSRD
adopted customary contractual arrangements between firms and life scientists . . . [and] in these standard con-
tracts, all rights were assigned in advance to the government, just as exclusive licensing if not outright patent
assignment was stipulated in interwar industrial sponsorship”: Rasmussen, “Of ‘Small Men,’ Big Science, and
Bigger Business” (cit. n. 5), p. 121.
31 Capt. Ralph Carlisle Smith, Restricted Memorandum to Technical Personnel, 15 Nov. 1943, copy in Leo
Lavatelli Papers, Bag 6, American Institute of Physics Collection, Niels Bohr Library. See also David Hawkins,
“Toward Trinity,” Pt. 1 in Project Y, ed. Hawkins (cit. n. 6), pp. 1–259, on p. 34.
32 The first law allowing “secrecy orders” covering patents that could be used for defense purposes was ratified
by the U.S. Congress in 1917. It would be reintroduced during World War II and permanently adopted as Public
Law 256 in 1952, thereby allowing the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Army to make letters patent secret and forbid
the issuing of a patent until further decision by the U.S. military agencies involved. Moreover, U.S. Code 37
allowed the government to extend from six months to three years the time allowed for the U.S. patent office to
respond to the applicant for an invention used by the government. This period could be extended for another
three years if the government officer responsible for keeping the patent secret decided that it was necessary.
“Secret” patents would be kept in a safe in the patent office, and only the Chief Examiner and his assistant would
be allowed to see them. See “Senate Hearing on Atomic Energy, Atomic Bomb Patents” (cit. n. 1).
33 Hawkins, “Toward Trinity,” pp. 60–63. In August 1946 Smith endorsed the directorship of a newly created
12 “FOR SLOW NEUTRONS, SLOW PAY”
Figure 2. Fermi and Segre` at Los Alamos in 1945. Courtesy of AIP Emilio Segre` Visual Archives.
Eighteen of the five hundred patents produced at Los Alamos were based on Fermi’s
inventions, including patents on nuclear reactor designs, processes, methods, and instru-
mentation that were assigned to the U.S. government for the symbolic price of one dollar.
Handled by Smith and Lavender, most of these patents were issued after ten years.34
Both scientists and patent officers recognized that patents filed before the beginning of
the project should be dealt with through some kind of licensing or compensation agree-
ment. Fermi and Segre` were fully aware that they were entitled to compensation for the
slow neutron patent, given the vital role of the process in recent research on nuclear
reactors. So while at the end of 1943 Captain Smith was busy instructing the Los Alamos
personnel about the importance of record keeping and proper security precautions, Fermi
and Segre` were considering how to activate negotiations with the OSRD officers. In the
early months of 1944 Segre` asked Fermi to put pressure on Lavender and Smith to make
an offer (see Figure 2). But no offer was forthcoming from Lavender, who probably
believed that the question of settlement could be set aside until the war was over. The
Italian physicists were very unhappy about these delaying tactics and considered informing
General Leslie Groves, the project’s military head, as to the state of affairs. On 14 July
D-Division, which was responsible not only for patents but for documentary matters more generally, including
classification and declassification, drafting, illustration, and even artwork. Connecting declassification and patent
matters in this fashion ensured that scientific reports produced at Los Alamos were routed in such a way that
government’s interest was also protected from a patent standpoint. See Edith C. Truslow and Ralph C. Smith,
“Beyond Trinity,” Pt. 2 in Project Y, ed. Hawkins (cit. n. 6), pp. 263–353.
34 These were assigned to the AEC, signed by Robert A. Lavender as attorney and Herbert E. Metcalf as
witness. They were all issued with a “Secrecy Order.” Copies of the patents are in Box 19, Folders 9 and 10,
Fermi Papers.
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1944 Fermi, Segre`, Smith, and Lavender had a meeting at Los Alamos, but it proved
inconclusive.35
The Italian scientists also wanted to inform the other inventors and Giannini that the
slow neutron patent had proved—indeed, dramatically increased—its commercial value.
But any disclosure of the reasons for this increased value (i.e., in connection with MED)
would have led them to contravene Los Alamos security regulations, if not openly chal-
lenge the Espionage Act.36 In order to avoid complications, Segre` and Fermi prepared a
draft letter for Giannini, which was eventually shown to the OSRD patent officers, in
which they claimed that the inventors were now in “a better position” to negotiate with
possible “parties that might be interested” in the patent. But Giannini made it clear that
he did not want his company to relinquish ownership of the patent.37
After the war, Fermi and Segre` left Los Alamos for positions at the University of
Chicago and Berkeley, respectively. Giannini, who became aware of the potential value
of the slow neutron patent after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (and the
publication of the Smyth Report), now decided to be more involved in discussing patent
matters with parties interested in its purchase. In October 1945 Giannini wrote directly to
Bush, who promised him that compensation would be effected and agreed on a sum of
about $900,000. Yet further negotiations involving Bush, Lavender, Giannini, and his
attorney, Lawrence Bernard of Washington, D.C., proved ineffective.38
The war changed the significance and commercial value of the neutron patent, which
was now implicated in the military uses of atomic energy. Fermi and Segre` assumed the
responsibility of defending the other inventors’ interests. This was known to Lavender and
the other military advisors, who tried to take advantage of the situation the war had created.
Although Lavender established rules that legally authorized compensation, they were not
implemented.39 Since the slow neutron process was already being used in military and
35 Segre` stressed that allowing use of the patent without registering a complaint would have led to the loss of
all the related intellectual rights. Although he did not intend to behave in a fashion that was hostile to the project,
he believed it necessary to lodge a formal protest about the lack of consideration of these issues. See Segre` to
Fermi, 7 Dec. 1943, “Emilio Segre`,” Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers. At this stage, Fermi would have been
happy to consider a sum of about $450,000 for the outright sale of the patent. See Fermi’s memorandum, 23
May 1944, Folder 7, Fermi Papers. On the fruitless meeting see Segre` to Robert Lavender, 29 July 1944, Box
9, Folder 2, Fermi Papers.
36 The Espionage Act forbade Los Alamos workers and any other persons involved in the war effort from
communicating any details relating to the project. As Fermi wrote in a memorandum: “Segre` and I were con-
cerned as to the fact that by not disclosing to Giannini our knowledge of new applications and uses of the patent
we were acting contrary to the agreement with Giannini. We were aware on the other hand that disclosure of
the facts to Giannini would violate the Espionage act. Consequently we were asking the Government Attorneys
for written instructions.” Fermi’s memorandum, 23 May 1944, Folder 7, Fermi Papers.
37 Fermi to Colonel Herbert Metcalf, 9 Dec. 1943, Box 9, Folder 9; Fermi to Segre`, 9 Dec. 1943, Box 9, Folder
10; Segre` to Giannini, 9 Dec. 1943, Box 19, Folder 2; and Segre` to Fermi, 11 Mar. 1944, Box 19, Folder 2,
Fermi Papers.
38 Giannini to Vannevar Bush, 19 Oct. 1945, Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers. Similarly ineffective were
negotiations between Szilard and Lavender on the chain-reaction patent. According to Lanouette, Szilard “limited
the government’s payment to his actual expenses . . . plus a customary $1.00 patent fee. A settlement for the
value of the chain-reaction patent itself, Szilard insisted, would be worth much more”: Lanouette, Genius in the
Shadows (cit. n. 18), p. 254. In comparison, the terms agreed to by some scientists within the context of the
British nuclear program, Tube Alloys, were far more favorable. Von Halban and Kowarski assigned their patents
to the Directorate of Tube Alloys in exchange for salaries more than twice what they were already receiving and
a promise of 14 percent of the profits from the exploitation of their patents on nuclear fission. See Gowing,
Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (cit. n. 6), p. 212.
39 In 1946, Segre` wrote to Fermi that Lavender “cerca di spremere tutti all’ultimo sangue [tries to get from
each of us as much as he can until the last drop of blood],” because he wanted to have rights on every patent,
even those produced at universities: Segre` to Fermi, 27 May 1946, Box 2, Folder 13, Fermi Papers.
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industrial applications, the OSRD officers could resort to all sorts of delaying tactics rather
than compensating Giannini and the inventors immediately, causing them much frustration.
SOMETHING TO GO NOWHERE: THE MCMAHON ACT, 1946–1948
From 1946 the attorney Bernard assumed control of all the legal procedures relating to
Fermi’s patent, thereby becoming a chief actor in negotiations with the U.S. government
representatives. An expert Washington lawyer, as well as a former chief counsel of one of
the divisions of the Treasury Department and a partner in the law firm Sullivan, Bernard,
and Shea (John L. Sullivan was an Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy for Air), Bernard
was fully aware of how recent political and legislative developments could affect the patent
case.40 His attempts to finalize a settlement, however, were thwarted by the provisions in
the McMahon Act pertaining to the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Although in theory this new law should have restored legality in the handling of atomic
patents, it in fact muddied the waters by combining the question of patent compensation
with other issues, such as control over atomic energy at the national and international
levels. The controversies surrounding the patent provisions of the bill not only took center
stage in the political arena but also delayed the compensation process.
In the postwar years the definition of new legislative means to control atomic energy
became one of the prominent aspects of U.S. policy-making. In July 1945 President Harry
Truman established a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), led by Senator Brien
McMahon, to make recommendations about the country’s future atomic policy. The trans-
fer of atomic energy from military to civilian control was seen as a priority for the new
legislation. But the process leading to the passage of the McMahon Act was tortuous; the
bill was approved only after legislative maneuvering that drained support from the com-
peting bill put forward by Senator Edwin J. Johnson of Colorado, whose proposal had
been more favorable toward military control of atomic energy. Although the legislation
was primarily aimed at ensuring that control over information and processes leading to
the production of atomic weapons would be safely kept by the American government, it
also had to ensure that a governmental monopoly would not pose obstacles to the industrial
development of atomic energy. Financial considerations were indeed very important in the
final approval of the McMahon Act.41 The final bill, S.1717, was produced in the fall of
1945, amended by Congress, and approved by the Senate in April 1946. On 1 August
1946 the Atomic Energy Commission was created.42 It included a General Advisory Com-
mittee (GAC), with Fermi as one of its members.
Patents had been one of the most controversial aspects of the new bill, which recognized
the imperative to safeguard the secrets of the atom bomb by prohibiting individuals or
companies from filing new patents and allowing the AEC to purchase all existing patents
relating to the production of fissionable materials. Thus, the compulsory purchase of pat-
ents was just what the bill enacted. On 11 February 1946 the JCAE had interviewed Captain
Lavender, who stressed that the principle of compulsory purchase was already in force in
existing legislation. He argued that all the information contained in atomic patents was
40 Giannini to Segre` (copy to Fermi), 2 Feb. 1946, Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers.
41 E.g., U.S. Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace supported the bill because it would “foster and develop
economic, medical and other peaceful uses of atomic fission and its by-products”: H. A. Wallace, “Supports the
McMahon Bill,” Bull. Atom. Sci., 1946, 1(5):6–7. On the establishment of the JCAE see Hewlett and Anderson,
New World (cit. n. 8), p. 411.
42 Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 513.
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already in the hands of the military and thus could not be disseminated. Thus, inventors
who had designed patents in the field of atomic energy could profit only by assigning them
to the government; they would then be rewarded with a compulsorily agreed “just com-
pensation.”43 Lavender’s position was consistent with that of others, such as Bush, who
saw existing patent claims as matters to be settled by the military in a context completely
separate from that outlined by the new AEC legislation. They held that the new legislation
should not have had any specific patent provision—this was also the reason why they had
supported the rival bill proposed by Johnson.
But Lavender’s argument anticipated Section 11 of the McMahon Act, which stipulated
that “no patent will be issued for any discovery or invention useful solely for the production
of fissionable material or atomic energy for military weapons; but the commission will
compensate for such invention or discovery” and that “the commission is authorized to
purchase, take or condemn and make compensation for any invention or device useful
solely in the production of fissionable materials for military weapons.” The patent provi-
sions of the bill were attacked in the U.S. Congress as the “Soviet” part of the new
legislation.44 Some analysts pointed out that governmental control could in some measure
vitiate the primary functions of the patent system. Others reasoned that these provisions
represented a good compromise, as they could prevent private monopolies.45 The position
of the inventors who had developed the methods deployed in the military and industrial
uses of atomic energy did not concern many commentators. It was probably believed that
the lag between legislating on these matters and putting the provisions into effect would
be very short. However, this was not the case—precisely because the military administra-
tors lost control of patent issues, which were now the responsibility of the new AEC
administrators.
In 1946 Fermi and his former coworkers considered the outright sale of their patent for
about $900,000 a reasonable outcome.46 The inventors would even have been happy to
43 Lavender pointed out that the compulsory purchase of patents would come “under police power” rather than
“eminent domain.” He also argued that an inventor refusing compensation had no chances of further legal
protection. He could appeal to the Court of Claims, but he would have no way to prove his case as he could not
“obtain from the Government the facts concerning the equipment that corresponds to his patent”: “Senate Hearing
on Atomic Energy, Atomic Bomb Patents” (cit. n. 1), pp. 10–11.
44
“The Revised McMahon Bill,” Bull. Atom. Sci., 1946, 1(9):2–5. The patent provisions were attacked by the
American Bar Association, the Association of Manufacturers, and the National Patent Council. The chairman of
the House Patents Committee denounced the proposal as “the end of the patent system,” while a former com-
missioner on patents criticized it as a provision modeled on the Russian system, calling it dangerous and so-
cialistic. See Byron S. Miller, “A Law Is Passed: The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,” University of Chicago Law
Review, 1948, 15(4):799–821; and Hewlett and Anderson, New World (cit. n. 8), pp. 495–498.
45 Gordon K. Lister, “Government Patent Rights,” Bull. Atom. Sci., 1946, 1(11):15–16; and Edward H. Levi,
“The Atomic Energy Act: An Analysis,” ibid., 1946, 2(5):18–19. One defender of the bill was Casper W. Ooms,
a future AEC Commissioner on Patents, who argued that “the act provides an elaborate but flexible procedure
designed to prevent the acquisition of patents in the field in which the AEC is given absolute governmental
monopoly”: C. Ooms, “Atomic Energy and U.S. Patent Policy, Pt. 2: Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act,” ibid., 1946, 2(11):30–31. In 1948 the “socialist vision” in the bill was defended. Science advisors Byron
S. Miller and James R. Newman, who had helped to draft the bill, claimed that it had done “nothing less than
establish in the midst of our privately controlled economy a socialist island with undefined and possibly ex-
panding frontiers”: Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political Economy of Postwar American
Science” (cit. n. 8), p. 144.
46 A meeting between Giannini, Bernard, Lavender, and Bush was held on 2 Feb. 1946. Bush argued in a
“carrot and stick” fashion that if the inventors “are shooting for very high stakes—such as to collect, say, 5%,
of the production value of the Hanford Plant—or several million dollars—he would not recommend our offer,”
but he also noted that he was “sincerely interested in proceeding with this matter and in settling it before he
leaves his office”: Giannini to Segre` (copy to Fermi), 2 Feb. 1946, Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers. This was
certainly consistent with Bush’s political stance at the time: he wanted to wrap up all matters pertaining to
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consider compensation of $50,000 each (for a total $500,000), but Giannini was more
resistant to this compromise figure as he had sold shares in his company during the war
and, in the case of an outright sale, he would not profit enough.47 On 14 June 1946 Bernard
made a final proposal to Lavender, offering to sell the neutron patent for a sum not less
than $450,000; Lavender replied, “Well, now we have something definite to go on.” But
this overture led nowhere, and by July Giannini was once again writing to Bush soliciting
the final formulation of an offer. Segre` described Lavender as “extremely uncooperative.”48
Yet whether Lavender was cooperative or not, the creation of the AEC had in fact
rendered the negotiations between Bernard and his opposite number at the OSRD pointless,
as it was now the AEC’s responsibility to purchase the neutron patent and arrange to
compensate the inventors. Section 11 of the McMahon Act recommended the establishment
of a Patent Compensation Board (PCB) that would negotiate and settle awards for patents
dealing with the production of fissionable materials. In January 1947 a Patent Policy Panel
was established to provide recommendations for effecting the patent provisions of the
McMahon Act. Bernard discovered that all the documentation relating to the neutron patent
had been transferred from Bush’s administration to the AEC.49 Six months later, however,
the panel had yet to prepare regulations establishing procedures for processing claims, a
prerequisite for looking at individual cases in detail. These regulations were finally pro-
duced only in June 1948.50
The panel took so long to hammer out the new regulations chiefly because repeated
attacks on the patent provisions of the McMahon Act, which intensified during 1948,
obstructed its work. Because the act was supposed to facilitate the international control of
atomic energy, it established a governmental monopoly on patents as a temporary mea-
sure.51 Both within and outside Congress, many lobbied for new legislation that would
wartime research—with all its implications—and open a new institution devoted to basic research, the National
Science Foundation, that would operate under scientists’ control. See Kevles, Physicists (cit. n. 8), p. 345; and
Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science,” p. 146.
47 Giannini also asked the inventors to agree to donate part of the future royalties to him, a request that further
eroded their relationship. See Segre` to Fermi, 7 Feb. 1946, “Emilio Segre`,” Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers.
48 L. J. Bernard to Giannini (copy to Fermi), 14 June 1946, “Patents,” Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers (reporting
the $450,000 offer and Lavender’s response). “Fermi and to a lesser degree myself have been extremely generous
in patent matters with the Govt. as Mr. Lavender knows, and I think he is trying to pull the rope too much”:
Segre` to Giannini, 28 May 1946, “Emilio Segre`,” Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers.
49 Ooms was a member of the Patent Policy Panel; see “USAEC Report to Congress,” Bull. Atom. Sci., 1947,
3(9):275–280. Regarding the transfer of the neutron patent documentation see Bennett Boskey, “Inventions and
the Atom,” Columbia Law Review, 1950, 50:433–447; and Bernard to Giannini (copy to Fermi), 3 Jan. 1947,
Box 19, Folder 2, Fermi Papers. Years later, Rasetti claimed that “the American government at first was favorable
to giving compensation. It was favorable when atomic energy was managed by the Department of Defense.
Because of General Groves. And then Bush, who was a big shot and he knew Fermi. They appreciated what
Fermi and Segre` had done for the Manhattan Project, so they were well disposed to it. When the AEC was
created and Atomic Energy went into the hands of civilians, then they were extremely unpleasant”: Franco
Rasetti, interview with John Kennedy, 1966, Fermi Documentary Film Collection, Harvard Project Physics, Box
1, background research materials and interviews, Niels Bohr Library.
50 The PCB was given power to negotiate the purchase of patents. According to the new regulations, the PCB
was supposed to proceed if the owner of the patent and the commission were unable to agree on royalties, taking
into consideration four main factors: the extent to which the invention was developed through federally financed
research; the degree of its utility, novelty, and importance; the cost to the owner of developing the invention;
and the actual use of the invention in the atomic program. See Boskey, “Inventions and the Atom.”
51 Since 1945, Dean Acheson and David Lilenthal had been leading a commission working on the international
control of atomic energy under the auspices of Truman’s administration. In 1946 Truman nominated Bernard
Baruch as representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. On 14 July 1946 Baruch addressed
the commission with a new plan that differed substantially from that put forward by the Acheson/Lilienthal
commission but still advocated the international control of atomic energy. See Hewlett and Anderson, New World
(cit. n. 8), Chs. 15 and 16. The Soviet Union’s refusal to cooperate in the establishment of an international
control agency derailed this plan.
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eliminate the patent provisions of the McMahon Act in order to “restore incentive to private
research.”52
THE UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A COMPENSATION CLAIM, 1948–1950
It was not until 13 October 1948 that Bernard could finally apply for compensation on
behalf of Fermi and his colleagues, claiming that U.S. patent no. 2,206,634 covered “the
basic process used in research and development leading up to the production of atomic
energy and the production of the atomic bomb.” The invention of slow neutron absorption
was said to be of “continuing importance in the production of fissionable materials and
atomic weapons”; moreover, the technique was used “in the original experimentation for
the development of atomic energy for military purposes.” In light of the importance of the
slow neutron process, the claim prepared by Giannini asked for $1 million as just com-
pensation for the rights conferred by the patent and $100,000 a year “for the remaining
life of the patent” (which would expire in 1957) as a license on future applications, in-
cluding “the production of radioactive isotopes.”53 The claim filed by Giannini was for
$1,900,000. Unofficially, however, Bernard stressed that the inventors were willing to settle
the matter for a lump sum of $900,000, as agreed by Bush in October 1945.
The patent legislation and its provisions had already delayed the claimants’ case, and
Giannini’s request was now promising to cause more trouble. Giannini decided to stick
with the initial offer discussed with Bush rather than the final offer made by Bernard to
Lavender ($450,000) because of his dissatisfaction over these delays. Moreover, he was
unhappy with the contract binding him and the inventors. Giannini & Company would
receive one eighth of the final sum awarded for the patent, with Giannini himself getting
one thirty-second of that total (he now owned only 25 percent of the company). He thus
decided to “raise the price” with the PCB. Giannini’s move did not impress Segre` and
Fermi. They objected that they were not responsible for his decision to sell shares of his
company to third parties. The decision to stick with the higher figure was thus controver-
sial; Segre` opined that “by challenging the government, [Giannini] could end up breaking
his neck [col governo (Giannini) potrebbe anche rompersi il collo].”54
The PCB began to function five years after the start of negotiations regarding the Fermi
patent. Effectively established in April 1949, it docketed only seven cases up to March
1950. This was “an inexplicably low figure,” according to Bennett Boskey of the AEC
Office of General Counsel, but in fact not a surprising one given the pessimistic views
most claimants now held as to the chances of settlement.55
52 The act “effectively shuts out all private initiative and . . . means inviting selected industrial laboratories to
work out pieces of a master development plan established by the Commission”: Karl Cohen, “A Re-Examination
of the McMahon Act,” Bull. Atom. Sci., 1948, 4(1):7–10. See also Walter DeCew, “New Legislation to Replace
the McMahon Act,” ibid., 1948, 4(9):277–279. It is worth noting that the debate over the patent provisions of
the act ran in parallel with a similar debate about the establishment of the National Science Foundation, where
two parties (one led by Senator Harry Kilgore and the other led by Bush) argued, respectively, for and against
public ownership of patents derived from publicly funded research. See Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left,
and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science” (cit. n. 8), p. 141.
53 G. M. Giannini and Co., “Application for Just Compensation and the Determination of a Reasonable Royalty
Fee under Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946” (cit. n. 1).
54 Segre` also feared that Giannini would make a fool of himself in the eyes of government officials; see Segre`
to Fermi, 15 Nov. 1948, “Emilio Segre`,” Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers.
55 Boskey, “Inventions and the Atom” (cit. n. 49), p. 435. Among the cases considered by the PCB were the
Seaborg and Segre` patents on the production of plutonium. A detailed list of the docketed cases is in ibid., p.
444.
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In June 1949 Boskey analyzed the circumstances pertaining to Fermi’s patent and pre-
sented his legal comments on Giannini’s claim before the PCB. It was not good news.
Boskey denied all the allegations forming the core of Giannini’s application, claiming that
the slow neutron method was not essential to the production of fissionable material; that
the invention did not cover the basic process used in research and development leading
up to the atom bomb; and, more generally, that the invention was not used as the basic
process for the development of atomic energy for military purposes. The neutron patent
disclosed a process for the utilization of the slowed-down neutron principle, but Boskey
denied the use of such a principle in the production of radioactive isotopes. Finally, he
insisted, the claims relating to a licensing fee of $100,000 per year for the use of the patent
in the future production of radioactive isotopes were unfounded.56
Most significantly, objections were raised in regard to the legal status of the claimants.
Boskey drew attention to the fact that some of those interested in the applications were of
foreign nationality. Although this did not by itself “disqualify” them from receiving com-
pensation, there were “certain circumstances arising by virtue of the particular nationality”
that gave rise to “special questions.” Quoting from the Treaty of Peace ratified by the
Italian government on 10 February 1947, Boskey stressed that “the United States was not
obliged to return industrial properties to Italian nationals” and that “Italy or its nationals
were not entitled to any patent with respect to inventions of war materials (whereas this
included bombs and all means for exploiting or operating them).” A following Memoran-
dum of Understanding, executed on 14 August 1947, also discharged the United States
from claims against the U.S. government relating to “the use of patents or inventions” by
Italian nationals.57 Boskey thus disputed the positions of Amaldi, D’Agostino, and Tra-
bacchi because they were still Italian citizens.
Boskey also pointed to Fermi’s GAC membership as a complicating factor. He argued
that Fermi was not entitled to apply for compensation because the pertinent legislation
stipulated that no right of action in respect to patents was given to U.S. government
employees. More generally, Boskey observed that Section 109 of the Criminal Code en-
titled the U.S. government to take legal action against anyone prosecuting a claim against
it while being one of its officers or employees.58
Boskey’s report seemed to set the stage for refusing the claim—or at least his robust
evidence would seem sufficient to force Giannini and Fermi to accept whatever the PCB
might have offered. This was the result of a new system of patent provisions that had
consolidated governmental control over atomic energy and therefore greatly limited the
contractual power of scientists. The new “socialist” vision with regard to atomic patents
had led to a new attitude on the part of the AEC administrators, who were now less
convinced that compensation should be awarded. And now more problems—including
anti-Communist hysteria and the intensification of secrecy regulations—would arise to
delay the compensation process even further.
“WITCH HUNTS” AND “BARGAINING POINTS,” 1950–1953
The discovery of a spy ring centered at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, in 1946
led to questions about the role of espionage in the dissemination of information on the
56 B. Boskey, Office of the General Counsel, “Response to the Application of G. M. Giannini and Company,
Inc.,” USAEC-PCB, Docket No. 2, 6 June 1946, pp. 3–9, copy in “Neutron Patent,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2,
Amaldi Collection.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., pp. 10–14.
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U.S. atomic program. Further investigations raised fears that the Soviet effort to harness
nuclear weapons had been fostered thanks to information provided by scientists in the
United States and Britain. As this debate intensified, it also involved discussions about the
McMahon Act, civilian versus military control over atomic secrets, and patent provisions.
Boskey’s legal advice regarding the slow neutron patent must be seen in the context of
intensified pressure to avoid the dissemination of classified information during legal pro-
ceedings and to allow the FBI to conduct full background investigations on all people with
access to restricted data.59 On 23 September 1949 Truman announced that there was clear
evidence that the Soviets had tested their first atomic bomb. This announcement not only
increased fears about the role of spying activities but also coincided with a reevaluation
of secrecy policy in the field of atomic energy. Inevitably, the slow neutron patent settle-
ment fell afoul of these issues, all of which affected the claimants’ chance to “bargain”
for reasonable compensation.
The reaction of the inventors to Boskey’s response was one of disappointment. Fermi
now claimed that he had embarked on the compensation negotiations mostly in an attempt
to defend the interests of his former colleagues, as by this point he had far less interest in
the patent as such.60 But he was very concerned about some of the matters raised in
Boskey’s report. Because he wanted clarity as to whether the accusation of a conflict of
interest was grounded, he wrote directly to the AEC General Counsel, attorney Joseph
Volpe, who judged the matter very important and sought clarification from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice.61 In November 1949 Fermi was informed that claiming compensation
from the AEC did not constitute a criminal act but that the accusation of a conflict of
interest was founded. In its final decision the Department of Justice also stressed that
Fermi’s GAC membership not only should have prevented him from presenting a com-
pensation claim but also invalidated the claims presented by others associated with him.
The depiction of a conflict of interest so exasperated Fermi that he considered leaving the
GAC.62 And when his term of membership expired in July 1950 he did not renew it; these
legal concerns were a factor in his decision, along with the political controversies about
whether the United States should build a hydrogen bomb that divided the advisory com-
mittee.63
59 Boskey noted that it was difficult for claimants to present a convincing case owing to the secrecy requirement,
which “really works its hardship more on the applicant”; that the General Counsel had access to all the pertinent
information, while the applicant “is to a considerable extent working in the dark”; and that applicants could not
cross-examine witnesses on different methods in use, as they would trespass into the area of secret information:
Boskey, “Inventions and the Atom” (cit. n. 49), p. 442. See also Miller, “Law Is Passed” (cit. n. 44).
60 Writing to Segre` in December 1949, Fermi stressed that he participated in the compensation negotiations
reluctantly and that he probably would never have started them had he been the only inventor: Fermi to Segre`,
14 Dec. 1949, Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi Papers.
61 Fermi stressed that the matter “came to me as a complete surprise”: Fermi to Joseph Volpe, 29 June 1949,
Fermi Papers. On 3 Aug. 1949 Volpe informed Fermi that he intended to explore these issues with the Department
of Justice: Volpe to Fermi, 3 Aug. 1949, Box 19, Folder 4, Fermi Papers.
62 Fermi wrote to Segre` that “under these circumstances I am seriously considering whether I should not resign
from the GAC”: Fermi to Segre`, 9 Jan. 1950, Box 19, Folder 4, Fermi Papers. He did not do so because in the
following months Congress passed a bill allowing GAC members to file suits on patents.
63 In a letter to Bernard written on 15 Apr. 1950, Fermi stressed that he was ready to resign from the GAC if
such action was absolutely necessary but that he preferred to let his appointment expire naturally “in order to
avoid misinterpretations of the reasons for my resignation.” He stressed that a sudden resignation would be
“damaging” rather than “helpful” to the claim and that, as the commission had taken steps to promote a revision
of the law, he was more inclined to wait rather than to resign immediately. See Fermi to Bernard, 15 Apr. 1950,
copy in “Neutron Patent,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi Collection. In any case, Fermi’s decision to leave the
GAC has been the subject of much speculation, and it is still unclear why he decided not to renew his membership
in July 1950. Maltese suggests that the accusation of a conflict of interest particularly annoyed the Italian
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Giannini and Bernard’s propositions for compensation were far more aggressive than
anything Fermi had in mind. In February 1950, when new hearings were scheduled, they
were willing to show their support for an amicable solution of the patent controversy.
However, as Boskey’s report on the matter had in effect taken all earlier offers off the
table, they began to feel that it was time to apply additional pressure. They decided to file
a petition with the U.S. Court of Claims and publicize its content in the press. This was
intended as a measure to force the PCB to conclude the case and accept the claimants’
offer of settlement without further unfriendly acts.64
Writing to Fermi on 15 August 1950, Giannini stressed his intention to use the petition
as a means to pressure the AEC. But the petition he filed asked for $10 million. He argued
to Fermi that though “admittedly this figure has no bearing on the settlement,” it was likely
to “arouse some interest in the press.” But Giannini’s approach certainly did not please
the Italian inventors, who had been unhappy with the price mentioned in the original claim,
filed two years earlier. Fermi replied that he had no idea that Giannini had such an amount
in mind and insisted that asking for such a high figure, “even only as a bargaining point,”
would put them all in a “very unfavorable light before the public opinion and ultimately
decrease greatly the chances of a just settlement.” Above all, Fermi feared the reaction of
the press, which at a time of rampaging McCarthyism was already investigating atomic
scientists employed by the government. Replying nine days later, Giannini emphasized
that Bernard, not he, had decided to ask for so much money, basing the move “on his
experience with other similar . . . cases.”65
But was this strategy really advantageous? It is worth considering that only a few months
before the claim was filed, the first allegations about the role played by the German scientist
Klaus Fuchs (an e´migre´, like Fermi and some of the other inventors) in providing secret
details on atomic weapons to the Russians appeared in the press. Thus Giannini and Ber-
nard may well have chosen the wrong moment to “go public.” Soon major newspapers
around the world reported that the Italian physicists associated with Fermi were asking
$10 million for the patent. It was easy for the media to perceive—and present—the de-
cision as yet another unpatriotic challenge to the U.S. government, rather than as a prin-
cipled attempt to force a long-postponed settlement. Bernard recommended that the in-
ventors be extremely factual with the press, answering questions and seeking a “minimum
of publicity.”66 But his strategy did not succeed, and matters soon escalated beyond his
control.
Bruno Pontecorvo was one of the inventors named in the slow neutron patent. His name
physicist, even though the vexing debate as to whether the U.S. government should build a hydrogen bomb
certainly contributed to his decision: Maltese, Enrico Fermi in America (cit. n. 11), p. 348. In late 1949—just
when the conflict of interest accusation was unfolding—Fermi and I. I. Rabi composed a minority GAC report
in which they stressed that thermonuclear weapons were “necessarily an evil thing in any light.” It is thus equally
plausible that, as the political pressure to build the “Super” increased and Fermi’s views became less influential
in the GAC, he decided to leave. See Peter Galison and Jeremy Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the
Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,” Hist. Stud. Phys. Sci., 1989, 19:267–347, on pp. 317, 336; and
Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Touchstone, 1995), pp. 401–402.
64 A conciliatory attitude is expressed in Giannini to Segre`, 20 Feb. 1950, “Giannini,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2,
Amaldi Collection. But—frustrated with the government’s delaying tactics—they had been considering filing a
petition in the Court of Claims since late in 1949. This approach aroused the opposition of the inventors: Segre`
and Fermi were against going to a court trial. See Segre` to Fermi, 10 Dec. 1949, Box 11, Folder 13, Fermi
Papers.
65 Giannini to Fermi, 15 Aug. 1950; Fermi to Giannini, 18 Aug. 1950; and Giannini to Fermi, 24 Aug. 1950:
“Neutron Patent,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi Collection.
66 Giannini to Fermi, 24 Aug. 1950, “Neutron Patent,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi Collection.
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was widely mentioned in the press reports that had created the recent frenzy regarding the
court case. But in the summer of 1950 Pontecorvo was very concerned for his professional
position. He was also worried by the witch hunts prompted by allegations of nuclear
spying, and he would thus have preferred to maintain a low profile. In 1948 Pontecorvo
had been appointed Senior Principal Scientific Officer at the Harwell nuclear establishment
in Britain, the same place were Fuchs had been working. In March 1950, following Fuchs’s
arrest, Pontecorvo confessed that he had Communist relatives in Italy, although he de-
scribed himself as uninterested in politics. While in Italy on holiday, Pontecorvo learned
from newspaper reports about the recent claim put forward by Giannini and his attorney.
Already scared by the witch hunts and aware that his employer knew about his Communist
acquaintances, he certainly did not welcome the publicity deriving from his involvement
in a $10 million suit against the U.S. government. Less than a month after the claim was
filed, Pontecorvo fled to the USSR. The Italian physicists in the United States feared that
they might be held accountable for the disappearance of their colleague, while new alle-
gations about Pontecorvo being an atomic spy appeared in newspapers. Giannini withdrew
from the court case, claiming that he wanted nothing to do with people involved in “in-
ternational mysteries”; he suspected that in fact the inventors bore some responsibility for
Pontecorvo’s defection.67
Fermi and Segre` certainly feared the consequences of the Pontecorvo case, and they
had to face hearings with AEC officers to discuss it in detail. In these complicated circum-
stances, it was Franco Rasetti who now stepped forward to represent the other inventors
in the neutron patent case (see Figure 3). On 3 November 1950 Rasetti visited Bernard to
discuss the consequences of the Pontecorvo affair. Segre` had been “advised” by AEC
managers to proceed with settling the case, but—in light of Pontecorvo’s defection—for
an award much less than that initially considered.68
During the period in which the Pontecorvo affair erupted, Fermi, Segre`, and Rasetti
proved to be extraordinarily firm in resisting pressure from the press and their colleagues
in the scientific community, as well as in facing Giannini’s decision to withdraw from the
case.69 Giannini eventually reversed his decision and continued to represent the inventors,
67
“I am today instructing my attorney to eliminate and disinvest my company of any interest in the $10,000,000
damage suit now pending in the US Court of Claims. . . . This action is a result of the surprise and shock resulting
from the amazing disclosure that Bruno Pontecorvo . . . has reportedly disappeared into Russia under circum-
stances that are highly questionable. . . . I am an American citizen first, and my interests and interests of my
company are concerned primarily with the principles of freedom and democracy. Regardless of what sum of
money is involved, we do not care to be associated with anyone whose principles or beliefs in our form of
Government is in any way in question”: Giannini press release, copy in Box 19, Folder 7, Fermi Papers. As
Segre` wrote to Rasetti: “The Pontecorvo affair is producing all kinds of disagreeable complications, as you can
easily imagine. Giannini seems to feel that we have some responsibility for Pontecorvo, especially I, as repre-
sentative of the inventors.” Segre` to Franco Rasetti, 25 Oct. 1950, “Giannini,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi
Papers. For more on Pontecorvo see Turchetti, “Atomic Secrets and Governmental Lies” (cit. n. 23), pp. 404–
405.
68 Fermi’s official statement, made at the request of Senator McMahon, stressed that he did not know the
reasons behind Pontecorvo’s “alleged escape” to the Soviet Union. See E. Fermi, “Statement about Bruno Pon-
tecorvo,” 13 Mar. 1951, Box 15, Folder 12, Fermi Papers. After World War II Rasetti had openly criticized those
involved in the Manhattan Project, and he abandoned nuclear physics studies for research in paleontology.
However, as he had been responsible for some of the research leading to the neutron patent, in 1950 he actively
worked for a quick and satisfactory settlement. See Rasetti to Segre`, 3 Oct. 1950, “Giannini,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo
2, Amaldi Papers.
69 Segre` wrote to Fermi, “Yesterday Louis Alvarez came unrequested [sic] to my office and explained to me
that he thought it extremely improper that we should ask compensation for the patent because we would have
paid more than a million dollars apiece to avoid being in Italy during the war, and since the United States has
taken us as guests in this country we should give recognition to the United States by conferring to them whatever
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Figure 3. Amaldi, Rasetti, and Segre` in their old age. Courtesy of AIP Emilio Segre` Visual Archives.
but by then it was clear that Pontecorvo’s defection had enormously deflated their bar-
gaining position. Withdrawing the compensation claim entirely at this point would have
looked rather suspicious. But clearly the PCB was ready to use recent developments to
turn negotiations in its favor. The inventors were well aware that it was time to accept
whatever conditions were offered; they were eager to settle the matter quickly and at any
price.
In 1951, then, the Italian inventors agreed to request a lump-sum settlement about one
third of what had initially been agreed with Bush. Bernard made an official proposal to
the PCB in January 1951 and again in August 1951. Anderson informed Bernard that the
PCB now appeared to be interested in settling the claim amicably. However, he also
stressed that, in view of the objections raised by Boskey (and in light of the Pontecorvo
case), the PCB could only consider a “figure much lower” that the one originally proposed
by Bernard. On 4 December 1951 Rasetti wrote to Segre` that the AEC was silent once
again. Rasetti now feared that, because the inventors had renounced the U.S. Court of
Claims proceedings, the whole matter could be delayed indefinitely. “It is a pig-headed
system,” he wrote, “but now they can do whatever they want.”70
we could. . . . We can not have illusions about the fact that whispering campaigns or defamatory statements will
be made against us.” Segre` to Fermi, 25 Oct. 1950, “Giannini,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi Collection.
70
“E` un sistema da porci ma si possono permettere tutto quello che vogliono”: Rasetti to Segre`, 4 Dec. 1951,
“Giannini,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi Collection. For Anderson’s response to Bernard’s official proposal
see R. A. Anderson to Bernard, 14 Aug. 1951, “Giannini,” Scatola 2, Fascicolo 2, Amaldi Collection.
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The final breakthrough came on 19 November 1952. Bernard informed Rasetti that the
AEC appeared willing to agree to a settlement of $300,000. As the days turned into months,
Segre` became even more exasperated. But the AEC had made a final decision to pay the
inventors, and it was now discussing the payment technicalities with the Treasury. In the
summer of 1953 the settlement was finally effected.
Eight years after the end of World War II, each of the inventors pocketed around $28,000
after taxes. Giannini’s company received the same amount of money. The only interested
party who did not receive a penny in royalties was Bruno Pontecorvo, whose share was
returned to the AEC and put in a bank account since he was still officially “missing.” In
1955 Pontecorvo surfaced exactly where he was thought to be: in the Soviet Union, at the
Dubna Institute of Physics, a circumstance that—not surprisingly—did not entitle him to
collect any money.
CONCLUSIONS: THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY ON ATOMIC PATENTS
This essay shows that the slow neutron patent had been an important matter for Fermi
during most of his career. When he first considered applying for a patent relating to the
slow neutron method, its industrial possibilities were only dimly understood. Yet during
the late 1930s and 1940s Fermi became increasingly aware of its importance and impli-
cations and of how it had opened a path toward the applications of nuclear energy. Thus,
the patent became a further incentive to expand and focus his research as well as an
opportunity to benefit from the innovations associated with applied nuclear physics. It was
only in 1949—following the accusations of a conflict of interest—that the problems as-
sociated with the purchase of the patent made it a burden.71 Even so, Fermi’s patent had
been an important motive for his research from its onset to the design of nuclear reactors
and afterward. As the history of this patent sheds new light on Fermi’s research motives,
it also suggests that the study of patents can provide an innovative historical perspective
by showing how private business concerns and expectations have driven important devel-
opments in the physical sciences in the twentieth century.72
The history of Fermi’s patent also illuminates, in a very distinctive way, how the rela-
tionship between scientists, the military, and the U.S. government was shaped by disputes
about intellectual ownership. Because the slow neutron patent was one of only two that
received compensation, it in fact provides an almost unique opportunity for exploring how
legal controversies intersected with the development of atomic research in wartime and
postwar American science. This study suggests that the establishment of U.S. nuclear
71 The atomic patent was at the center of more legal controversies. Part of the compensation deriving from the
PCB was put aside to pay for proceedings against the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) for a
similar infringement of Fermi’s patents in Canada. However, in the early 1960s the Exchequer Court of Canada
rejected the claim. Most harmed by the unfolding events were the managers at Philips, as the company had an
exclusive right to exploit Fermi’s process in Europe. When Philips heard about the AEC compensation to the
inventors, it started negotiations related to these infringements first with the AEC and then with the United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Philips representatives claimed that they should receive com-
pensation for about $20 million from the AEC. The claim was rejected and Philips never received any money.
By contrast, negotiations with the UKAEA terminated in 1958, and Philips was able to undertake a financial
partnership with the UKAEA to market radioisotopes.
72 For more details on Fermi’s patent as a motivator, especially with regard to his career in the 1930s, see
Turchetti, “Invisible Businessman” (cit. n. 11). This case contrasts with that of the Stanford physicists vs. Sperry
described by Galison, Hevly, and Lowen. There, the management of patent issues led the scientists to experience
a “loss of control” over the direction of their research; it also raised worries as to whether “selling their inventions”
amounted to “selling their souls”: Galison et al., “Controlling the Monster” (cit. n. 4), p. 75.
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programs coincided with the concentration of patents under a regime of centralized control.
This centralization weakened the contractual power of individual scientists and inventors,
put governmental and military research agencies in the position of patent owners, and
strengthened the position of contracting corporations, which could use innovative instru-
ments and processes under a regime of public licensing. In this respect, by looking at one
specific and hitherto unexplored aspect, this work complements existing studies that have
analyzed shifts in the economy of power that characterizes big science.73
This transition of power in connection with the management of intellectual rights un-
folded in three different historical contexts and gained momentum during the war and
postwar years. The wartime patent policy adopted within the Manhattan Project was
molded by the belief that, during the prewar years, American corporations had been achiev-
ing a monopoly on significant inventions by building patent pools. The war emergency
did little to reverse this trend, and the OSRD continued to manage innovation in a system
that rewarded a very limited number of big corporations. Its patent provisions sought to
accommodate the financial interests of scientists and corporations alike, but in reality they
gave commercial contractors intellectual property terms more favorable than those offered
to most academic scientists. In this respect the case of nuclear physics does not differ from
that of other fields, such as biomedical research, where the OSRD “mediated” between
corporations and scientists by adopting the existing prewar patent system. In contrast with
biomedical research, however, the establishment of new secret laboratories such as that at
Los Alamos was disruptive of existing relationships between nuclear physicists and their
business partners, as the correspondence between Fermi, Segre`, and Giannini shows.74
This disruption served further to strengthen the position of the military and its industrial
contractors while diminishing the contractual power of scientists. Patents’ assignors (or
scientists) could claim compensation for the use of patents filed before the war. But al-
though compensation was promised, it usually failed to materialize.
In theory, the establishment of a governmental agency devoted to administering all
matters pertaining to nuclear energy, the Atomic Energy Commission, should have restored
legality in the management of atomic patents. But in practice it eroded the contractual
power of Fermi and other scientists. Many of those (including Bush, Fermi, and Compton)
who had actively contributed to the war effort and had tried to “navigate” in the “agitated
waters” of wartime contractual procedures were convinced that the end of the war would
restore a free trading system in which big corporations, small businesses, and scientists
would operate without government intervention in patent matters.75 Bush’s grand vision
included the possibility of separating military/applied and basic/pure research, making it
possible that those patent cases implicated in military research could all be settled and the
73 For similar conclusions see Leslie, Cold War and American Science (cit. n. 8); and Rasmussen, “Of ‘Small
Men,’ Big Science, and Bigger Business” (cit. n. 5).
74 Wartime patent policy was a major concern for Vannevar Bush because his company, the Raytheon Cor-
poration, had been forced out of business when General Electric and other companies formed a patent pool on
vacuum tubes; see Kevles, Physicists (cit. n. 8), p. 345. Nonetheless, OSRD granted 40 percent of its contracts
to just ten corporations, 66 percent to sixty-eight corporations: ibid., p. 342. On the situation in biomedical
research see Rasmussen, “Of ‘Small Men,’ Big Science, and Bigger Business,” p. 142.
75 As Kevles has noted: “Bush believed that the nation’s prosperity would depend on small business applying
new technologies in a useful manner. He thus endorsed governmental curbs on the domination of markets by
large industrial combinations through patents or any other device.” Kevles, Physicists, p. 345. Leslie also claims
that Bush “always considered OSRD a strictly emergency operation and dismantled it promptly at the end of the
war, despite considerable opposition from the Pentagon and the White House”: Leslie, Cold War and American
Science (cit. n. 8), p. 7.
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patents compulsorily purchased. This was the reason why he (and Fermi) had supported
the Johnson bill, which would have maintained military control over atomic energy but
provided no specific patent provisions, in preference to McMahon’s proposed law. Passage
of the Johnson bill would have left the management of patents in the hands of the military,
which—as Lavender clearly stated before the JCAE—already possessed sufficient au-
thority to take these matters to a successful conclusion. And, consistent with these inten-
tions, the initial act proposed by Bush and others that sought to establish the National
Science Foundation (NSF) did not contain patent provisions either. Bush’s support for a
settlement of Fermi’s patent at a reasonable price (Lavender may have delayed compen-
sation or “bargained” for a better deal, but he was not hostile in principle) followed the
same general idea.
Yet Bush’s plan was opposed in the Congress by the competing bills of McMahon
(establishing the AEC) and Kilgore (establishing the NSF). Both embodied a “socialist”
vision of patent legislation pushed forward by liberals and the progressive left alike: the
first included provisions that demanded a government monopoly on atomic patents and
the second demanded public ownership of patents.76 As the “socialist” vision became more
powerful in Congress, it combined with the idea that all the innovations essential to in-
dustrial and military uses of atomic energy should be put under governmental control. Yet
it was not this new legislation as such that obstructed the possibility of a settlement but,
rather, the new administrators’ approach to patent issues. Those within the AEC who took
control of patent matters were far less well disposed than Bush to settle the claim. They
certainly foresaw that no economic advantage could derive from the acquisition of Fermi’s
and others’ patents, since the processes described were already used in the nuclear program.
Acquisition was necessary only to prevent or avoid charges of infringement or unlawful
use of patented processes. In any event, these administrators’ interpretation of the new
legislation and their consequent reluctance to compensate the inventors “slowed down”
the whole settlement process.
Developments relating to domestic anti-Communism, and real or alleged spying activ-
ities, also cast a shadow over the resolution of these controversies. The unpredictable
consequences of this situation, including Giannini’s inflated judicial claim for $10 million,
reflected both dissatisfaction with the negotiations and new fears and anxieties deriving
from the Cold War. The history of Fermi’s patent adds a new dimension to studies of
political persecution in the United States during the 1950s. It shows that some of the
scientists who were subjected to scrutiny during the “witch hunts” also had ongoing legal
and financial issues with the U.S. government. One might then ask whether there was a
connection between political repression and ongoing disputes of a legal-financial nature.
The case of Bruno Pontecorvo may be an exception, as it is unlikely that other scientists
76 Wang has correctly noted that the final NSF bill was no victory for Bush and his allies or for their adversaries:
“the NSF, weakened by years of legislative delay, fell far short of the intentions of both the Bush and Kilgore
camps”: Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science” (cit.
n. 8), p. 147. The system put in place demanded public ownership of patents. This functioned as a disincentive
to patenting research—a complication that, as Rasmussen and Washburn have noticed, continued through the
1970s; the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act and the curtailing of public funding restored links between scientists, academia,
and industrial sponsors. See Rasmussen, “Of ‘Small Men,’ Big Science, and Bigger Business” (cit. n. 5), p. 145;
and Washburn, University, Inc. (cit. n. 3), p. 63. However, in an attempt to reveal the controversies that the Bayh-
Dole Act has generated, this work suggests that until the new act was passed, existing patent provisions kept
research free from proprietary control. My research shows that this was true only to a limited extent, as govern-
mental control of intellectual rights greatly favored contracting corporations over the scientists working under
contracts.
26 “FOR SLOW NEUTRONS, SLOW PAY”
suspected of spying activities also had similar interests in intellectual property rights.77
Even so, the Pontecorvo case was influential in limiting the negotiating power of Fermi
and his associates, and the AEC administrators were quick to exploit it to gain more
favorable conditions for the patent purchase. This suggests that political repression may
well have informed similar legal arguments between scientists and the government.78
A final settlement occurred—by and large—because of “Atoms for Peace” and the
growing interest in exploiting atomic energy for industrial purposes. Giannini’s 1950 pe-
tition received considerable media coverage. Clearly, the presence of such a controversy
would have upset the campaign, as well as its political and economic goals. But the set-
tlement did little to reverse the existing trend to secure intellectual property rights in the
field of atomic energy. Most “atomic patents” continued to be military secrets under AEC
control until the late 1950s. Certainly, more patents could be produced, yet none could be
subject to trade and their sale to the AEC was compulsory. Requesting compensation for
atomic patents filed in the 1930s and 1940s was the only viable option, but the case of
Fermi’s patent shows the difficulties of obtaining it. Only one other set of patents (those
filed by Segre` and his Berkeley associates on plutonium) were compensated by the PCB;
all the other claims were rejected.79 The final acquisition of all patents for which claims
were filed was achieved by the AEC at a total cost of $700,000. The agency could then
license corporations such as General Electric and Westinghouse for the trade of nuclear
radioisotopes and nuclear reactors alike. This meant that costs for intellectual property
rights amounted to as little as 0.005 percent of the total revenues derived from selling
nuclear products abroad, whereas prewar contracts had ensured inventors no less than 5
percent of total revenues. On the whole, the governmental monopoly system on atomic
patents had not diminished the contractual power of corporations; indeed, it augmented it.
It did not reverse the practices of the prewar years but actually reinforced them. If a
“socialist” patent regime had been put in place, then it seemed to accrue only to the
advantage of big firms that exploited it once the AEC had secured intellectual property
rights at bargain prices.80
77 However, Wang has pointed out that some of those scientists who had originally supported the new patent
provisions experienced political repression in the 1940s and 1950s. See Wang, “Liberals, the Progressive Left,
and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science” (cit. n. 8), pp. 165–166.
78 Two other interesting cases mixed political persecution and financial controversies. One relates to Hans Von
Halban, who was considered a security risk by American military officers but also had interests in the patents
on nuclear fission. The dismissal of Von Halban from the Anglo-Canadian nuclear program was officially attrib-
uted to the fact that he had disclosed secret information while traveling to France. Yet according to Halban this
disclosure was necessary, as he had to reveal to Joliot the content of patent agreements between himself, Ko-
warski, and Britain’s nuclear administrators; see Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (cit. n. 6), pp.
209–215. The other case is that of Boris Pregel, the Russian-born U.S. sales agent involved in trading uranium
during the war. On 13 February 1946 warrants were issued against Pregel on a charge of conspiracy to defraud
Eldoardo, the Canadian Crown company that had supplied some of the uranium used during the Manhattan
Project. The accusation came out at about the same time as the discovery of the Canadian spy ring. In this case,
though the media were quick to link the two events, the Canadian government was interested in keeping the
Pregel scandal, which involved financial issues, from being confused with the spying activities of covert agents.
See Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company (Toronto: Univ. Toronto Press, 1984),
pp. 152–158.
79 Even the plutonium patents’ owners received compensation only after the AEC tried to acquire their patents
“free of charge”: Emilio Segre`, A Mind Always in Motion (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1993), pp. 246–
247. Similar claims for patents on nuclear fission filed by Joliot and others were also rejected after a long court
case that opposed the AEC to the French Commissariat a` l’Energie Atomique; see Gilguy, “Good Example of
Protection in the Nuclear Field” (cit. n. 6).
80 This does not mean that corporations associated with the AEC were satisfied with the “socialist” patent
provisions. If these provisions allowed them to dispose freely of some scientists’ inventions, they still prohibited
them from receiving royalties for new patents. “Atoms for Peace” also coincided with a revision of the McMahon
Act that actually provided several incentives to corporations willing to invest in the nuclear industry.
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The history of the neutron patent has thus been entangled with that of the atomic energy
program in its military and industrial developments. If it is true—as the historian David
Noble claimed in 1977—that “patents petrified the process of science” and that the “frozen
fragments of genius became weapons in the armories of science-based industry,” then this
essay shows that the “petrification process” was a controversial one that had profound
implications for the balance of economic power between atomic scientists, industry, and
the nuclear state in the twentieth century.81
81 David Noble, America by Design (New York: Knopf, 1977), p. 111.
